





A Response to Michael Pauen’s “Self-Determination. 
Free Will, Responsibility, and Determinism”


































































































with	 regard	 to	 some	 former	 state),	 there	 is	 only	 one	 way	 of	 acting	 which	
can	ensue.	This	is	true,	at	least,	if	we	suppose	the	agent	to	behave	rationally.	
























interpret	 the	 issue	of	 freedom	 in	 terms	of	whether	or	not	we	may	 succeed	
in	forebearing	future	changes	of	preferences.	Actually,	this	kind	of	reformu-


















really	 represents	 a	 promising	 and	 plausible	
idea	of	addiction.	For	an	alternative	view	see	
R.	Jay	Wallace,	“Addiction	as	a	Defect	of	the	
Will”,	 in:	 R.J.W.,	 Normativity and the Will: 
Selected Essays in Moral Psychology and 
























not	 focus	on	particular	actions	and	 their	 (more	or	 less	clearly	stamped)	ra-
tional	qualities.	Instead,	Aristotle	endorses	the	idea	of	a	good	life	with	regard	








anticipating	 a	 central	 aspect	 of	 the	 famous	discussion	on	akrasia which	 is	
unfolded	in	book	VII	afterwards.	Contrary	to	Pauen’s	view	and	in	accordance	
with	Aristotle,	we	may	hold	agents	responsible	for	their	irrational	actions	even 














According	 to	 the	 compatibilistic	 view	 presented	 above,	 the	 self	 is	 nothing	
but	a	pragmatically	isolated	part	of	a	comprehensive	network	of	interwoven	















it	“is	completely	unclear	what	 it	means	 to	act	 in	a	self-determined	way,	as	
long	as	it	remains	to	be	spelled	out	what	the	self	is”	(p.	5).
